I. INTRODUCTION
The goal of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (the Rules) has been, since its inception in 1938, to administer "the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding." 1 In an effort to further the purpose of the Rules and simplify access to the federal courts, Rule 84 was promulgated in 1938 as part of the original Rules to have Official Forms in the Appendix (the Forms) to illustrate the simplicity and brevity the Rules contemplate. 2 Over time, through amendments to Rule 84, the Forms became authoritative illustrations for guaranteed sufficiency under the Rules. 3 However, in response to the growing complexity of litigation and the change to the pleading standards from notice pleading to plausibility pleading announced by the Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. v Supreme Court approved in April 2015. 7 After serving as an illustration of sufficiency under the Rules for seventy-six years, the Forms and Rule 84 could be gone on December 1, 2015, if Congress does not intervene and stop abrogation during the remaining step of the Rules Enabling Act process. 8 Because of the magnitude of the amendments Rule 84 was considered alongside, 9 the Rule 84 abrogation proposal received relatively little attention during the Rules Enabling Act mandated public comment period in August 2013. 10 Although this is a seemingly simplistic change, this Comment will address how the abrogation of Rule 84 will have profound effects on civil litigation despite many of the arguments the Judicial Conference, the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (Standing Committee), the Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure (Advisory Committee), and the Rule 84 Subcommittee have cited in favor of abrogation during the Rules Enabling Process. This Comment will argue that abrogation of Rule 84 will have a negative practical effect on the bench, the bar, and pro se litigants. The only group that truly benefits from the abrogation of Rule 84 is the Committees in the Rules Enabling Act Process who will no longer have the responsibility to modify the Forms to reflect the needs of modern litigation. More importantly, the abrogation of Rule 84 implicitly heightens the pleading standards despite the Supreme Court's admonishment of Twiqbal as requiring heightened pleading. 11 The Forms should be modified, rather than abrogated, to continue to serve as sufficient under Rule 84 because of the negative effects abrogation will have on civil litigation and the heightened pleading standard that will inevitably result.
Part II of this Comment provides a brief background on Rule 84 and the Forms as well as the recent split in the federal courts regarding the validity of Rule 84 and the Forms following Twiqbal. Next, Part II will present the different options considered by the Committees in the Rules Enabling Act process to address the concerns surrounding Rule 84 and the Forms. Part II concludes with the ultimate decision of the Advisory Committee, the Standing Committee, the Judicial Conference, and the Supreme Court to abrogate Rule 84 and the Forms. 12 Part III first explores the seven reasons cited throughout the Rules Enabling Act process in favor of abrogation of Rule 84 and the Forms in detail. 13 Part III addresses the seven reasons in favor of abrogation ultimately as two overarching motivations for abrogation-(1) the Forms and Rule 84 creating tension with Twiqbal and (2) the Forms simply not being useful in modern litigation.
14 First, this Comment will argue in Part III that despite the Advisory Committee's statement that abrogation of Rule 84 and the Forms does not "bear[] on the evolution of pleading standards," 15 the abrogation impliedly endorses Twiqbal as incompatible with Form pleading and directs the standard as heightened going forward. 16 Secondly, this Comment will address in Part III how the Forms remain useful in modern litigation and the negative effects of abrogation on the bench, the bar, and pro se litigants. 17 Part III concludes that the Forms should be modified to serve modern litigation needs as opposed to abrogated as the Judicial Conference, Standing Committee, and Advisory Committee have proposed. 18 This Comment, ultimately, suggests that a subcommittee of the Advisory Committee charged with modifying the current Forms, creating 11. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) ("Here, . . . we do not require heightened fact pleading of specifics . . . .").
12. 
A. The Adoption and Amendments of Rule 84
Rule 84 was included in the original Rules adopted in 1938. 20 At the time of original promulgation, the Advisory Committee noted that a number of state codes used forms to guide pleading. 21 Therefore, during adoption, the original drafters of the Rules made provisions for a limited number of Official Forms to "serve as guides in pleading." 22 The original Rule 84 (then Rule 86) stated the Forms attached in an Appendix to the Rules were "intended to indicate . . . the simplicity and brevity of statement which the [R]ules contemplate." 23 However, it was unclear whether the Forms merely acted as illustrations or sufficed to withstand attacks for compliance with the requirements of the Rules. 24 Courts determined that use of the Forms was discretionary and not mandatory. 25 A number of the courts upheld the use of the Forms as sufficient for withstanding attack under the Rules, 26 In 1946, Rule 84 was amended to resolve the split in the courts on the purpose of the Forms. 28 The amendment provided that "the [F] orms contained in the Appendix of Forms are sufficient under the [R]ules and are intended to indicate the simplicity and brevity of statement which the [R]ules contemplate." 29 The Advisory Committee Note for the 1946 amendment confirmed that the Forms contained in the Appendix of Forms were "sufficient to withstand attack under the Rules under which they are drawn, and that the practitioner using them may rely on them to that extent." 30 Thus, the insertion of the words "sufficient under the [R]ules" strengthened Rule 84; to the extent that when the Forms were properly used, they were "invulnerable to attack under the [R]ules." 31 Between 1946 and 2007, the Advisory Committee proposed only one amendment to Rule 84 in 1989. 32 The proposed 1989 amendment would have substituted a practice manual for the Appendix of Forms. 33 Like Rule 84 and the Appendix of Forms, the proposed practice manual would have been "sufficient under these [R] ules and any local district court rules and [were] intended to indicate the simplicity and brevity of statement that these [R]ules contemplate." 34 It was proposed that the Judicial Conference could amend the practice manual on recommendation of the Standing Committee to expedite the amendment process. 35 Thus, the proposed process would circumvent the formalities of the lengthy Rules Enabling Act process. The Rules Enabling Act is the rulemaking process through which the Rules and the Forms are adopted, amended, and abrogated. 37 The Rules Enabling Act states that " [t] he Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the United States district courts . . . ." 38 The work and oversight of the process the Supreme Court delegated to the Judicial Conference, which is the "principal policy-making body of the U.S. Courts." 39 The Judicial Conference consists of the Chief Justice, the chief judge of each circuit, the chief judge of the Court of International Trade and one district judge from each judicial circuit. 40 The Judicial Conference has allocated to the Standing Committee the responsibility to "carry on a continuous study of the operation and effect" of the Rules. 41 Underneath the Standing Committee, the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules is the initial evaluating body of all of the proposals for the civil rules. 42 The Standing Committee then reviews the findings of the Advisory Committee, and the Standing Committee recommends the change to the Judicial Conference.
43
Following recommendation by the Judicial Conference, the Supreme Court considers the proposals and officially promulgates the Rules. 44 The Supreme Court must transmit a proposed rule of practice and procedure to Congress by May 1 of the year in which the rule is to take effect. 45 Congress has retained power to review any proposed rule of practice and procedure. 46 Congress may object to the proposed Rule or do nothing, and the proposed Rule will take effect. 47 The proposed Rule takes effect no earlier than December 1 of the year of its transmission to Congress. 48 The Rules Enabling Act process can take two to three years, 49 1183-84 (2010) . Prior to the Rules, there were historically two systems of pleading-English common law pleading and code pleading. Id. at 1184. First, common law pleading was the era of "special pleading," which was "stiff and complex pleading . . . which prevented many plaintiffs from ever having their day in court." Id. The writ system and issue pleading exemplify the special pleading system of the common law. Id. The writ system "required a plaintiff to bring his suit under a single correct form of action or have his case dismissed," which was difficult because writs "overlapped" and the plaintiff could only plead one writ on a "borderline" case. Id. "Issue pleading required parties to work through pretrial averments and denials until they had narrowed the case to a single disputed issue of law or fact." Id. The rigid common law pleading system "led to a popular call for reform by citizens who recognized that procedural obstacles denied people access to the courts, and thus worked against fundamental fairness." Id. at 1185. Second, following the common law pleading system, pleading was statutorily reformed to a system called code pleading. Id. at 1186. "Code pleading replaced issue pleading with fact pleading, and replaced the writ system with a single form of action -the civil action." Id. Fact pleading in the code system required that "the parties stated the facts and the court applied the law." Id. An example of the code pleading system is:
[T]he law might provide the major premise that all people who ride horses in an unreasonable manner are negligent. The complaint could allege the minor premise that a various stages of litigation including summons, motion to dismiss, and motion to bring in a third-party defendant.
67
Early in the Forms' existence, critics were concerned that the Forms would make pleadings become "skeletonized" with a complete lack of facts. 68 One concern was that the Forms, including motions, complaints, answers, depositions, and affidavits, did not advise the court, lawyers, and person had ridden a horse blindfolded and run over a child. The court could then apply the alleged facts to the law and deduce that the plaintiff had a negligence claim against the rider. parties prior to trial what questions were to be decided. 69 The second concern critics expressed was that it would be easy for the Forms to mislead counsel because they concerned exceedingly simple factual situations.
70
Where more facts were involved, many critiqued that the Forms discouraged pleading "at greater length and with greater particularity." 71 The third concern expressed was that the Forms might cause unnecessary and burdensome discovery because the Forms could leave uncertainty as to the issues. 72 The fourth and final concern was that the minimal requirements of the Forms would spark unfounded litigation. 73 History has proven these apprehensions were generally unfounded. 74 Over the seventy-six year history of the Forms, there have been an estimated thirty modifications since their original promulgation.
75
Modifications include amendments to existing Forms, additions of new Forms, and deletions of unnecessary Forms. 76 Changes to the Forms are almost always made in conjunction with the corresponding Rule they illustrate. 77 Therefore, most changes to the Forms have generally been gradual. the court considered the sufficiency of Form 13 ("Complaint for Negligence Under the Federal Employers' Liability Act") and how the general principles of Twiqbal applied to the pleading of a recurring common law issue of a party alleging he or she was an employee at the time of the claim. 94 The defendant moved to dismiss for failure to satisfy Rule 8(a)(2) based on a failure to adequately plead an employee-employer relationship necessary to establish liability. 95 The plaintiff had merely pled the defendant "employed" him. 96 The District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri dismissed the complaint because Hamilton "merely allege [d] conclusion." 97 The Eighth Circuit reversed the motion to dismiss because "Form 13 makes clear that an allegation in any negligence claim that defendant acted as plaintiff's 'employer' satisfies Rule 8(a)(2)'s notice pleading requirement." 98 As consistent with the Supreme Court's charge in Iqbal, 99 the court noted practically that "[c]ommon sense and judicial experience counsel that pleading this issue does not require great detail or recitation of all potentially relevant facts in order to put the defendant on notice of a plausible claim." 100 Thus, the Eighth Circuit explained that because employee status is a frequently litigated issue, this was a plausibly alleged claim. 101 The Eighth Circuit interpreted Twiqbal as not necessarily departing from notice pleading where judicial experience and common sense dictate the level of specificity required.
C. Plausibility Pleading, Modern Litigation, and the Official Forms

102
Third, where the complaint is plainly modeled on the Forms, there are sufficient facts alleged in the complaint to make the claim plausible because Twiqbal recognized the latitude required in applying the plausibility standard. 103 In García-Catalán v. United States, 104 the First Circuit reversed the District Court for the District of Puerto Rico's dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint. 105 This was a slip-and-fall case where the plaintiff pled that she "slipped and fell on liquid then existing there" and "[n]o sign warned that the floor was wet."
106 "Under Puerto Rico law, a business invitee [had to] prove that the owner . . . of premises had actual or constructive notice of a dangerous condition in order to recover for injuries." 107 The defendant argued that the plaintiff's pleading had failed to allege that the defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition that allegedly existed. 108 The First Circuit reversed the dismissal after noting that the complaint was plainly modeled on Form 11, which disclosed the date, place, and time of the alleged tort as well as delineating the nature of the dangerous The First Circuit stated that plausibility pleading "properly takes into account whether discovery can reasonably be expected to fill any holes in the pleader's case."
110 This is consistent with Twombly's statement that the hallmark of plausibility is when a complaint contains "enough fact[s] to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence."
111 Where the defendant controls a material part of the information, then it is unreasonable to expect that plaintiff would have the information without discovery.
112
Some courts have recognized that the Forms suffice for simpler claims, but they are insufficient under Twiqbal with respect to more complex matters.
113
In Limestone Development Corp. v. Village of Lemont, Illinois, 114 the Seventh Circuit recognized that all claims-including claims with potentially complex or costly litigation-must have some degree of plausibility to survive dismissal. 115 The Seventh Circuit's view that the Forms were insufficient stated:
[H]ow many facts are enough will depend on the type of case. In a complex antitrust or RICO case a fuller set of factual allegations than found in the sample complaints in the [C]ivil [R]ules' Appendix of Forms may be necessary to show that the plaintiff's claim is not "largely groundless."
116
The Seventh Circuit expressed concern that with cases like RICO or antitrust violations ("big" cases both monetarily and in terms of time), the defendant should not be put to the expense of discovery on the basis of a "threadbare claim."
117 Thus, because of the complexity and cost of modern litigation, the Forms are only useful in certain simpler claims. Forms, specifically Form 18 for patent pleading, will not suffice as a short and plain statement of a claim that the pleader is entitled to relief under the pleading standards announced in Twiqbal.
121
Despite the plaintiff's argument that the Forms take precedence over the Supreme Court decisions, the court reasoned that the Supreme Court decisions on how to apply pleading standards are controlling and those decisions make the Forms no longer viable. 122 Thus, Macronix called into doubt the validity of the Forms and Rule 84 in the wake of Twiqbal.
Courts have recognized the tension between the Forms and Twiqbal outside of the patent pleading context as well. 123 In McCauley v. City of Chicago, 124 a case alleging equal protection violations against the City of Chicago, the Seventh Circuit dismissed the complaint for not plausibly stating a policy-or-practice equal protection claim and only containing generalized allegations.
125
The complaint lacked plausibility despite its compliance with the Forms, and both the majority and dissenting opinions discussed at length the insufficiency of the Forms.
126
Judge David Hamilton, who dissented in part, stated "Iqbal conflicts with the [F]orm complaints approved by the Supreme Court."
127 Judge Hamilton further reasoned the Forms "require virtually no explanation of the underlying facts as long as the defendant is informed of the event or transaction that gave rise to the claim."
128 However, the tension lies in the fact that the Forms are sufficient under the Rules but are "remarkably 'conclusory,'" which violates Iqbal.
129
Judge Hamilton, thus, recognized that unless there was an explanation of how to reconcile the tension between Iqbal, Rule 9(b), and the Form complaints, then "Iqbal conflicts with the Rules Enabling Act . . . and the prescribed process for amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." 130 Courts have found strong tension that is moving toward incompatibility between the plausibility pleading standards in Twiqbal and Rule 84 and the Forms. 139 Also, while discussing this suggestion, the Subcommittee considered abandoning the Form complaints while maintaining the remaining Forms. 140 Given that Rule 8(a)(2) and Twiqbal have been difficult for both the federal courts and practitioners to interpret, it seems counterintuitive to abandon the complaint Forms that could serve as illustrations of sufficiency.
The second suggestion from the Rule 84 Subcommittee was to completely overhaul the Forms. 141 The Advisory Committee considered "improving . . . the current [F] 144 Given that the Forms have been generally untouched for decades, this was an alternative that would have made them more useful to the modern practitioner in modern litigation.
The third suggestion was to retain the Forms but to delegate the modification of the Forms to the Administrative Office of the United States Courts. 145 The advice of the Administrative Office, which currently has its own set of forms, would be used in creating the Forms. 146 Delegating the responsibility for the Forms to the Administrative Office would take a substantial burden off the Advisory Committee. 147 However, the Advisory Committee expressed concern that a group outside the authority of the Rules Enabling Act process modifying the Forms was not legal. 148 It is unclear whether using the Administrative Office to create the Forms would be within the scope of the Rules Enabling Act, but it seems that the same concerns as . There are seventeen forms, which include forms for civil cover sheets; applications to proceed in district court without prepaying fees or costs; an order to proceed without prepaying fees or courts; subpoenas to appear and testify at a hearing or trial, to testify at a deposition, and to produce documents; notice of a lawsuit and request to waive service of a summons; waiver of the service of summons; summons in a civil action; summons on a third-party complaint; judgment in a civil case; clerk's certification of a judgment to be a registered in another district; notice and consent of a civil action to a magistrate judge; notice and consent of a dispositive motion to a magistrate judge; and warrant for the arrest of a witness in a civil case. Id. Several of the Administrative Office forms overlap with the Forms in the Rules, including the summons in a civil action, summons on a third-party complaint, waivers of summons, and notice and consent of a civil action to a magistrate judge. The fourth and final suggestion from the Rule 84 Subcommittee was to implement one of three sketches of Rule 84 drawn by the Rule 84 Subcommittee. 150 The three sketches drawn by the Rule 84 Subcommittee were variations of the Rule 84 language meant to retract the statement that the Forms suffice. 151 The first proposed sketch of Rule 84 was abrogation, which proposed to delete the entirety of Rule 84 and the Forms. 152 Thus, the illustration read:
Rule 84. Forms [Abrogated (mo., day, yr., eff. mo., day, yr.).]
The forms in the Appendix suffice under these rules and illustrate the simplicity and brevity that these rules contemplate.
153
The second proposed sketch of Rule 84 was to delete "suffice."
154 The illustration, in this sketch, read:
Rule 84. Forms.
The forms in the Appendix suffice under these rules and illustrate the simplicity and brevity that these rules contemplate. 155 The second sketch was a return to the 1938 version of Rule 84 where the Forms were merely illustrations as opposed to sufficient to withstand attack under the Rules. 156 This version was considered to have "defanged" Rule 84 by withdrawing the 1946 language about sufficiency. 157 The Subcommittee expressed concern that: 149. See supra notes 32-36, 50-51 and accompanying text (discussing 1989 proposed amendment that would have substituted a practice manual for the Appendix of Forms; it was proposed that the Judicial Conference could amend the practice manual without the formalities of the Rules Enabling Act process).
150. The Subcommittee did not want to revert to the problems experienced pre-1946 amendment, when it was unclear whether the Forms were sufficient to withstand attack under the Rules. 159 The third proposed sketch of Rule 84 was aspirational. 160 The final sketch read:
The forms in the Appendix suffice under these rules and illustrate the simplicity and brevity that t These rules contemplate simplicity and brevity of form. 161 The Rule 84 aspirational version was proposed to be a declarative statement of the purpose of the Rules rather than a Rule itself. 162 The Rule 84 Subcommittee noted that the wish for simplicity and brevity remaining in the Rules when "stripped of its present function, is too far back in the rules for this purpose." 163 The Rule 84 Subcommittee, after considering all four options, ultimately recommended abrogation. 164 
E. The Decision to Abrogate Rule 84
In September 2014, the Judicial Conference of the United States, following the public comment period and upon recommendation of the Standing Committee and the Advisory Committee, officially approved the amendment to abrogate Rule 84 and the Appendix of Forms. 168 The Judicial Conference approved Rule 84 abrogation for reasons substantially similar to the Standing Committee, the Advisory Committee, and the Rule 84 Subcommittee. 169 The proposal to abrogate Rule 84 and the Forms was then approved by the Supreme Court in April 2015, and it has been submitted to Congress where it will become effective on December 1, 2015, without Congressional action.
170
The Judicial Conference elected to keep Form 5, the request to waive service of summons, 171 and Form 6, a waiver of service of summons. 174 Rule 4(d)(1)(D) does not require the Form 6 waiver of service of summons, but it is closely tied to and considered alongside Form 5. 175 Ultimately, the only remaining remnants of the Forms, pending the submission period to Congress, will be Forms 5 and 6, which will be preserved by amending Rule (1) the tension that exists between the Forms and Twiqbal cannot be permitted to remain; and (2) the Forms are not useful in modern litigation to judges, practitioners, or pro se litigants. Upon further scrutiny, this section will argue these two reasons do not support abrogation. Abrogation of the Forms and Rule 84 will only lead to further confusion-the solution should be to retain Rule 84 and amend the Forms instead of abrogate because modern litigation and the pleading standards will benefit if the Forms remain.
A. The Reasoning for Abrogating Rule 84
In August 2013, the Advisory Committee published its proposal for public comment to abrogate Rule 84 and eliminate the Forms appended to the Rules. 177 The Advisory Committee summarized its decision to abrogate Rule 84 and eliminate the Forms in the official note following the proposal, which stated:
Rule 84 was adopted when the Civil Rules were established in 1938 "to indicate, subject to the provisions of these [R]ules, the simplicity and brevity of statement which the [R]ules contemplate." The purpose of providing illustrations for the [R]ules, although useful when the [R]ules were adopted, has been fulfilled. Accordingly, recognizing that there are many alternative sources for forms, including the website of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, the website of many district courts and local law libraries that contain many commercially published forms, Rule 84 and the Appendix of Forms are no longer necessary and have been abrogated. The second reason cited in favor of abrogation was that updating the Forms would be cumbersome and that time would be better spent elsewhere. 195 The Rule 84 Subcommittee's main concern was with the Rules Enabling Act process.
196
As discussed earlier in this Comment, proposals through the Rules Enabling Act process can take up to three years before passage because the process is rather arduous with numerous, lengthy steps.
197
First, the Advisory Committee drafts changes and submits a proposal to the Standing Committee.
198 If the Standing Committee passes the proposal, it goes to a six-month public comment period.
199 Any changes must be re-passed through the Advisory Committee, then the Standing Committee, then the Judicial Conference, then the Supreme Court, and finally through Congress. 200 A common concern with the Forms is that the Rules Enabling Act process is "not nimble enough to keep the Forms current," so the solution imposed was to "extricate[] [the Forms] from this process" entirely.
201
Opponents of the Forms argue that constantly updating the Forms through the Rules Enabling Act would come at the expense of and draw public attention away from more important projects. 202 discovery, pleading, and class actions. 203 The Advisory Committee stated discovery reform is the most pressing.
204
According to the Advisory Committee, the projects that might be brought in the Rules Enabling Act process must be carefully chosen because of the length of time, amount of labor, and money spent on the Enabling Act process. 205 It was concluded that " [d] evoting scarce Committee resources to sustained ongoing work on the [F]orms would come at a high cost." 206 The Advisory Committee also expressed concern that updating the Forms would divert the important resource of public engagement from the Rules to the Forms. 207 The Rules Enabling Act process includes a six-month public comment period where the public is invited to engage with the proposed amendments to the Rules and create suggestions for new amendments.
208
The Advisory Committee, despite having concluded that few members of the public commented or cared about the Forms, worried that changes to the Forms would "detract from the attention devoted to changes in the [R]ules themselves."
209 This is seemingly ironic given that one of the reasons cited for abrogation is that no one seemed to notice or care about the Forms during the August 2013 public comment period.
210
The third and fourth reasons for abrogation of Rule 84 and the Forms are that lawyers and pro se litigants rarely use the Forms. 211 The Advisory Committee ended its inquiry into practitioner usage with the statement that "many lawyers rely on alternative sources of [F]orms." 212 There is no indication where this information came from. With regard to pro se litigants, the Advisory Committee admitted that the Forms would be helpful but concluded that pro se parties likely did not know how to access or use the Forms. 213 Like the lack of practitioner usage, it is once again unclear where this information came from other than a statement made during a Rule 203. Id. at 408-09. 204. Id. at 409 (noting that "[d]iscovery is not likely to move off the agenda in the foreseeable future-the question tends to be which discovery issues press most urgently for attention, not whether discovery can be put aside for a while" 84 Subcommittee meeting that "there seems to be little indication that pro se parties" use the forms. 214 The Advisory Committee ultimately concluded that pro se litigants, like lawyers, could rely on other sources of forms that are more helpful than the Forms. 215 For example, the Advisory Committee noted that even prison libraries provide forms. 216 No formal empirical study was ever conducted to determine whether practitioners or pro se litigants use the Forms. 217 The only research done to explore practitioner and pro se usage was informal inquiries made by the Rule 84 Subcommittee in 2012. 218 Based on limited inquiries to select clerk's offices, pro se clerks, magistrate judges, and some lawyers, the Rule 84 Subcommittee determined that Administrative Office forms were frequently used and the Official Forms were seldom used. 219 Participants in the informal inquiries, however, attested that the Forms were useful for "young lawyers, and remain useful to 'verify that pleadings are sufficient. ' ground for relief that is plausible." 246 The Supreme Court also stated that although the court must "accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint," the rule is "inapplicable to legal conclusions" and "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." 247 Prior to Twiqbal, the standard for dismissal of a federal complaint was set forth in Conley v. Gibson, which stated "a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." 248 Nevertheless, in Twombly, the Court made clear that Conley's "no set of facts" language was abrogated and had "earned its retirement." 249 Commentators following Twiqbal have argued that the plausibility pleading standard is an unwarranted interpretation of Rule 8(a)(2) that heightens pleading standards to "frustrate the efforts of plaintiffs with valid claims to get into court." 250 Commentators also noted that although the Supreme Court stated it is not "apply[ing] any 'heightened' pleading standard," 251 plausibility pleading "requires different levels of factual detail depending upon substantive context," which ultimately makes the standard heightened and unclear. 252 Thus, following all the criticism of Twiqbal, there was even an effort to introduce legislation in Congress to restore Conley. It is motivated by policy concerns more properly vindicated through the rule amendment process, it places an undue burden on plaintiffs, and it will permit courts to throw out claims before they can determine their merit. Ultimately, the imposition of plausibility pleading further contributes to the civil system's long slide away from its original liberal ethos towards an ethos of restrictiveness more concerned with efficiency and judicial administration than with access to justice.").
251. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 469-70 n.14. Twiqbal immediately drew attention to the Forms because the Forms endorse the use of conclusory legal language like "owes," 254 "negligently,"
255 "willfully," 256 and "recklessly." 257 There was uncertainty about whether Twiqbal made the Forms obsolete, which led the Advisory Committee to consider all the broader questions about the necessity of the Forms. 258 Although the Advisory Committee insists that the decision to abrogate did not rest on incompatibility with Twiqbal and should not bear on the pleading standards, 259 the Twiqbal pleading standards were the catalyst for the Rule 84 discussion.
260 Twiqbal was undoubtedly a major factor in the decision to abrogate, which sends an implicit message that the Forms simply are not consistent with the Twiqbal pleading standards.
B. Abrogating Rule 84 is an Unwarranted and Implicit Endorsement of Twiqbal as a Heightened Pleading Standard Going Forward
The first overarching reason cited for abrogation is the tension that exists between Twiqbal and the pleading Forms, which should not support abrogation upon further inquiry. 261 Advisory Committee has come to its own implicit conclusion that Form pleading simply cannot exist post-Twiqbal. 263 Each Committee in the Rules Enabling Process has disavowed any connection between Twiqbal and the abrogation of Rule 84 and the Forms, yet Twiqbal has always been at the forefront of the abrogation debate. 264 Given the timing and amount of discussion surrounding Twiqbal during the Rules Enabling Process, it will be difficult to argue that the abrogation of Rule 84 and the Forms has nothing to do with Twiqbal, and therefore, this abrogation has no effect on the pleading standards. Because Congress will most certainly not intervene to block the abrogation of Rule 84 and the Forms, this abrogation would undoubtedly be an implicit endorsement of Twiqbal as a heightened pleading standard 265 requiring greater particularity than the Forms provide going forward.
Initially, the primary argument and the spark that started the abrogation discussion in 2009 in the Standing Committee and Advisory Committee was the alleged tension that exists between Twiqbal and the Forms. 266 The discussion of abrogation of Rule 84 began in October 2009, which was only five months after the Supreme Court decided Iqbal. 267 From the beginning of the process, the Advisory Committee itself noted the danger of abrogating Rule 84 for the stance it takes on Twiqbal. 268 The Advisory Committee recognized that abrogation of Rule 84 and the Forms would undoubtedly "generate a perception that the Forms were being abrogated because the pleading forms, sufficient under notice pleading as it had been understood up to 2007, no longer suffice under Twombly and Iqbal."
269 Even if this was factually incorrect and the Forms are in fact intended to be sufficient, the Advisory Committee noted that nothing could defeat the perception that inconsistency with Twiqbal was the reason for abrogation. 270 The Advisory In response to the apprehension that the abrogation was taking a particular stance on Twiqbal, the Advisory Committee suggested that the concern could be dispelled with a clear explanation that Rule 84 and the Forms are being abandoned for other reasons-particularly that the Forms are no longer used in modern litigation. pleading standards at all. 279 When the abrogation of Rule 84 (including the Advisory Committee Note) was submitted to the Supreme Court, the suggestion of the Advisory Committee to make it clear that Rule 84 is being abrogated for reasons other than to endorse Twiqbal as a heightened pleading standard was ignored. 280 It was only upon the Supreme Court's request in April 2015, when Rule 84 and the Forms had almost completed the Rules Enabling Act process, that the Advisory Committee included in the Advisory Committee Note to the proposed abrogation that "abrogation of Rule 84 does not alter existing pleading standards or otherwise change the requirements of Civil Rule 8." 281 However, arguably, even if it is strenuously and explicitly claimed that abrogation of Rule 84 does not imply any position on the sufficiency of the Forms under Twiqbal, there is still likely an implicit endorsement of a heightened pleading standard given how much of the debate has surrounded Twiqbal. Given the mixed messages sent throughout the Rules Enabling Act process regarding reconciliation of Twiqbal and the pleading Forms, the minimal coverage of the pleading standards in the Advisory Committee Note will not likely be enough to overcome the statement abrogation is making on pleading.
Legal academics from around the country have also recognized the danger of abrogating Rule 84 because it would essentially be blessing the pleading standard in Twiqbal as heightened without writing and passing an amended Rule as required in the Rules Enabling Act process. 282 During the public comment period in August 2013 on the possible abrogation of Rule 84 and the Forms, a number of law professors submitted comments opposing the abrogation.
283
The academic community expressed concern that publishing a proposal to abrogate Rule 84 and the Forms did not satisfy the Rules Enabling Act process. 284 The scholars explained, that implicitly adopts plausibility pleading as the standard going forward. This is all the more troubling given that one trenchant criticism of Iqbal and Twombly is that the Court abandoned its previously stated commitment to modifying the Federal Rules through the rulemaking process rather than through case adjudication.
285
If the abrogation of Rule 84 and the Forms made it through the Rules Enabling Process, the scholars were concerned that "the door [to debating on the pleading standards] [would] be effectively shut and the pleading rules will have been altered without any of the participatory deliberation that legitimizes the Federal Rules."
286
In response to the concerns of the academic community about the abrogation of the Forms also requiring amendment to the Rule it illustrates, the Advisory Committee merely stated it "considered this perspective but unanimously determined that the publication process and the opportunity to comment on the proposal fully satisfie[d] the Rules Enabling Act." 287 However, the Advisory Committee never explicitly responded to and explained whether this was in fact the endorsement of Twiqbal as a heightened pleading standard that would violate the Rules Enabling Act process as the academic community claimed beyond the conclusory statement that the concern had been addressed and the Rules Enabling Act satisfied.
288
Despite the various Committees' claims that the Forms constrain plausibility pleading and should be abrogated for that reason, there is no evidence that Twiqbal plausibility pleading has had a great impact on pleading practice up to this point. 289 The Forms are not actually causing the pressing conflict the Advisory Committee cited as a main reason for abrogation, 290 which makes abrogation truly unwarranted. Recent studies analyzing the rates at which motions to dismiss have been granted have indicated that plausibility pleading has not taken a dramatic departure from the days of notice pleading.
291
According to a Federal Judicial Center report, judges are not deciding motions to dismiss differently than they would have in the pre-Twiqbal era. 292 Motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim in 2009-10 (post- Twiqbal) were filed in 6.2% of all cases in the federal courts, which was 2.2% over the filing rate for such motions in cases in 2005-06 (preTwiqbal). 293 There was no increase in the rate of grants of motions to dismiss without leave to amend during that time period despite the increased filing of motions to dismiss. 294 Courts have found most modern pleading complies with Twiqbal based on the Rules, the Forms, and pre-Twiqbal case law. 295 Thus, any changes up to this point have been incremental at best, "allowing the common law process to continue carving a path for 'plausibility' pleading." 296 The statistics suggest that there is not necessarily a pressing need for the Advisory Committee to intervene to decide how to reconcile Twiqbal with the Forms. By choosing to take an implicit stance on the pleading standards through abrogation of Rule 84 and the Forms, there is no true resolution to the alleged uncertainty and tension in Twiqbal pleading. Arguably, the choice to abrogate Rule 84 and the Forms leaves only further room for ambiguity in http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/motioniqbal.pdf/$file/motioniqbal.pdf).
293 the already unclear Twiqbal pleading standards. The Advisory Committee stated that a primary benefit of deleting the Forms is that it would "leave[] the courts free to draw from the experience of hundreds of thousands of cases in tailoring pleading standards for all categories of claims. The lessons of the past will not be lost in this process, but [the Forms] will no longer impose awkward constraints." 300 However, with the Forms gone, now there will no longer be the uniform guidance on sufficiency that the Forms have provided during the plausibility pleading transition. Judges now may merely infer from the abrogation of Rule 84 that Twiqbal requires something more than the Forms illustrate, which will likely lead to hundreds of different interpretations of what is sufficient pleading. Given that the pleading standard can be outcome-determinative for some litigants, it seems imperative to have guidance on sufficiency when pleading instead of leaving sufficiency open to varying interpretations. With the Forms gone, there no longer will be uniform guidance on sufficiency.
Instead resources to amend, pro se litigants and practitioners rarely using the Forms, the availability of alternative Forms, and the purpose of the Forms having been fulfilled. 303 This reason also does not support abrogation upon further scrutiny. After seventy-six years of operation alongside the Rules, the Forms have become an important guarantor of the Rules for different members of the legal community. 304 The Forms have been authoritative examples used both as an illustration of compliance during drafting and a point of argument to verify compliance for litigants who are challenged on non-compliance with the requirements of the Rules. 305 With the Forms abrogated, the three primary groups that will be negatively impacted are: practitioners, pro se litigants, and judges. Abrogation of Rule 84 and the Forms will only benefit the Advisory Committee and the Standing Committee who will no longer have the responsibility to maintain the Forms.
Practitioners
Practitioners are the first group negatively impacted by the abrogation of Rule 84 and the Forms. The Advisory Committee has maintained throughout the Rule 84 abrogation debate that practitioners rarely use the Forms. 306 The Rule 84 Subcommittee based this generalized conclusion on a canvassed group of unknown "law firms, public interest law offices, and individual lawyers." requirements of Rule 9 and some federal statutes." 309 The complexity of modern litigation has "resulted in a detailed level of pleading that is far beyond that illustrated in the [F]orms," according to the Advisory Committee. 310 However, these arguments ignore a possible use of the Forms by practitioners. While the Forms can be drafting tools for new lawyers or pro se litigants, the Forms can also be a verification tool for all practitioners in more complex causes of action. 311 The Forms serve a dual purpose: they can be an illustration, but they also can be used to verify the validity of the complaint if challenged.
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Practitioners do not have to first use the Forms when drafting to later use them when arguing sufficiency under the Rules. 313 As previously noted, most practitioners in modern litigation use factual detail that goes beyond the Forms, 314 so drafting a complaint based on the illustrations in the Forms may not be the most important use for the Forms in modern litigation. The Forms were never meant to be an all-encompassing example of every cause of action and new federal statute in existence, which is a task better left to the Administrative Office of the United States Courts or local rules that may go through a quicker amendment process. 315 The Advisory Committee had already considered appending a practice manual to the Rules and explicitly rejected it in 1989 because it was not allowed under the Rules Enabling Act and did not serve the purpose of the Forms. 316 The The level of factual detail and particularity of Form 11 can be paralleled for other causes of action.
Similarly, a party may challenge based on substantial non-compliance with the Forms. For example, Form 6, which is a waiver of the service of summons, requires the date, the name of the plaintiff's attorney, and the signature of the attorney. 321 Where the attorney does not provide the date or his or her signature, the defendant could argue that the plaintiff failed to comply with Rule 4(d)(1), which is the rule for waiving service, based on Form 6. 322 Conversely, if the defendant were to argue the plaintiff failed to comply with Rule 4(d)(1) because the plaintiff failed to include an expected return date on the waiver form, Form 6 could be used to show that nowhere is there a place to fill in a required return date and therefore, it is not required by the Rule. 323 Because this important purpose of the Forms still exists in modern litigation, modernized Forms could undoubtedly be extremely beneficial to practitioners if challenged on sufficiency under the Rules. The Advisory Committee used a very limited and narrow view of the purpose of the Forms to conclude that practitioners do not have a use for the Forms, so it hardly seems that this argument should hold weight when the purpose of the Forms is viewed more broadly. 
Pro Se Litigants
Pro se litigants are the second group that will likely be affected by the loss of the Forms. The Rule 84 Subcommittee reported that there is "little indication that pro se parties often find the Forms, much less use them." 324 It was suggested that courts instead develop local forms for common types of litigation for pro se litigants. 325 The Forms have furthered the purpose of the Rules to secure better access to the courts for pro se litigants by making uniform illustrations of what pleadings suffice to withstand attack under the Rules, 326 which local forms cannot guarantee. Given the volume of pro se litigation in the federal courts, 327 one would assume forms with guaranteed authority would be extremely important given pro se litigants are often without sufficient legal training.
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The critique that pro se litigants do not know where to find the Forms or how to use the Forms also seems to be unfounded given that courts have recommended the Forms to pro se litigants before. 329 While the Committee has noted that pro se litigants do not likely know where to find the Forms and much less how to use them, the suggested alternative was to use the forms supplied by the local rules of each court or the Administrative Office 330 There is absolutely no indication, other than through assumptions made by the Advisory Committee, 331 that pro se litigants are more likely to find and use the forms supplied by the local rules of each court or the Administrative Office of the United States Courts. Because pro se litigants are required to comply with the Rules, 332 it hardly seems possible that they could not find the Forms in the Appendix.
The other issue of recommending unofficial forms to pro se litigants is that they do not serve the same purpose as the Forms because litigants do not have the guarantee that such forms will be sufficient to withstand attack under the Rules. 333 Rather than having unofficial forms from local courts or the Administrative Office, it seems more likely that a uniform, streamlined version of forms in a uniform location used throughout the federal court system, like those found in the Rules currently, would best serve pro se litigants. Without the Forms, it will likely hinder access for pro se litigants to the courts as early as the pleading stage.
The Federal Courts
Along with practitioners and pro se litigants losing authoritative illustrations of the Rules, the bench will have to grapple with seventy-six years of case law on the Forms 344 Thus, this may lead to the Forms having at the very least persuasive authority as to the meaning of the Rules in some jurisdictions. The Rule 84 Subcommittee itself recognized that if the Forms are "still made available through the Administrative Office or otherwise, courts may find them persuasive, even if not bound to find that conforming pleadings suffice." 345 To the extent that the Forms will still be available through the Administrative Office, it seems likely this will lead to tension for the judiciary of whether to recognize the Forms as persuasive or ignore the existing case law from the last seventy-six years completely. Because at least arguably abrogation will heighten the pleading standards under Twiqbal, 346 different courts are free to adopt different opinions on whether the Forms still garner any authority. This can only lead to further uncertainty in the already foggy Twiqbal plausibility pleading.
In addition to uncertainty in case law, judges will no longer have the Forms as a guaranteed illustration of sufficiency for non-compliant parties. Judges have often used the Forms for issues of non-compliance much like the parties-as a measure of what is expected under the Rules. 347 In Upon a mere allegation of negligence, the "defendant [has] sufficient notice to enable him to begin to investigate and prepare a defense." 355 The Seventh Circuit in Tamayo used the Form for negligence as a metric to determine if the plaintiff had enough facts in support of her sexual discrimination claim to be sufficient. 356 In Tamayo, plaintiff's claim of sexual discrimination avoided dismissal at the pleading stage of the proceeding because plaintiff alleged she was a female and she was paid less than other similarly situated males. 357 The court found that these allegations were sufficient with the requirements of Form 9 in mind. 358 It was never alleged that the plaintiff had drafted the complaint based on the Forms, but the Seventh Circuit chose to use Form 9 as a metric of sufficiency. 359 Thus, as judges are now charged with determining how to read Twiqbal, judges often use the Forms as metrics of sufficiency. With the Forms gone, judges will no longer have the Forms as a valuable tool.
D. Rule 84 and the Official Forms Should Be Modified Instead of Abrogated to Continue to Serve as Authoritative Illustrations of Sufficiency Under the Rules
The Forms coming into compliance with Twiqbal and modern litigation needs will be the most valuable option to address Rule 84 and the Forms in the long term for both the bench and the bar even though it will be the most burdensome alternative. When it is considered that the Forms themselves are authoritative by design, it becomes clear that the Forms cannot be permitted to remain in neglect given the needs of modern litigation and the Rules themselves, particularly in the pleading context. The options to address the tension are: (1) to ignore the Forms and allow the Twiqbal standard to render them insufficient, (2) allow the Forms to stay as they are and remain sufficient, (3) abolish the Forms entirely, or (4) have the Forms come into compliance with modern litigation. While abrogation of the Forms may be the easiest and simplest way to address any tension in the pleading standards and the Forms, it does not solve the root of the problem, which is that plausibility pleading is still as unclear as it was in 2009 when abrogation was first considered. Starting as early as 2009, the Advisory Committee recognized that "[a]ttempting to frame pleading forms while pleading standards remain in flux could be difficult." 360 The Advisory Committee in 2009 elected to put off a decision on abrogation until the pleading standards had taken a more concrete direction nationwide. 362 Further, in the Rule 84 Advisory Committee Note approved by the Standing Committee, Judicial Conference, and the Supreme Court during the Rules Enabling Act process, the only guidance provided on pleading was that Rule 84's abrogation was not meant to have any effect on the pleading standards. 363 There still seems to be no coherent explanation of sufficiency under Twiqbal, and the tactic to address it seems to be avoidance.
Given the uncertainty surrounding pleading, there is no better time to have an illustration of sufficiency in the Rules. When the Forms were initially adopted in 1938, they were intended to serve as illustrations to help calm uncertainty surrounding the new Rules. 364 surrounding the expectations of Twiqbal. The Advisory Committee has noted throughout the debate on whether to abrogate that the Rules are no longer in their "infancy" and are sufficiently developed that illustrations are no longer necessary to alleviate uncertainty. 365 Because the Rules are constantly being amended by the Advisory Committee and interpreted by the federal courts, it seems highly unlikely that a rule could reach such a level of maturity that it simply outgrows the need for illustration. Illustrations of the changes are arguably the best way to communicate the expectations and interpretations of amendments to the Rules. Given the split in the circuits on harmonizing Twiqbal plausibility pleading with the Forms, the ability to illustrate sufficiency of pleading in particular is more important than it perhaps has ever been before. 366 As the lack of modification in the more recent history of the Forms has come to the forefront in the Rule 84 and Forms abrogation debate, this is an opportunity to address the concern that there is no efficient way to ensure the Forms are in compliance with the Rules and modern litigation. Instead of deciding to abrogate because of the difficulty in amending through the Rules Enabling process and the increased workload to the Advisory Committee, 367 there can simply be a different process for creating and maintaining the Forms. One way modification of the Forms could be done is through a semi-permanent subcommittee chosen by the Advisory Committee. This addresses the concern that delegating to the Administrative Office, which the Advisory Committee has no power over, would violate the Rules Enabling process. This could be seen as a chance for groups of lawyers on all sides of litigation to create Forms that reflect shared needs. The subcommittee could be in charge of determining if the Rules could benefit from having a Form for illustration and appended. The subcommittee initially would have a large project to overhaul the entire set of Forms. However, once the initial modifications to the Forms are made, the Forms can be gradually changed and amended in coordination with changes to the Rules. By having practitioners, academics, and judges form a subcommittee dedicated to amending the Forms in concert with any amendments to the Rules, the Forms could become a more practical, modernized, and helpful practice tool.
By delegating the Forms to a subcommittee, this also could be an a manual of forms is not the purpose of the Appendix. 373 The subcommittee can take on the creation of forms where it deems uniformity important or where authoritative command may be necessary. As the Forms cover a wider scope, the Forms will be more useful to practitioners.
Second, because the Forms go through the same Rules Enabling process as the Rules, the Forms that survive will undoubtedly be worthy of authoritative command. Through the Rules Enabling process, practitioners and academics outside of the Advisory Committee and the subcommittee will have a chance to comment on the Forms and to take some ownership in the direction of the Forms. Conversely, practitioners do not have a say in the forms created through local rules, the Administrative Office for the United States Courts, or private online databases. Also, the alternative forms created through local rules or through the Administrative Office of the United States Courts do not allow for the uniformity, conformity, and sufficiency with the Rules that Rule 84 and the Official Forms provide. Furthermore, the alternatives are simply not put through the same rigorous debate and thorough review as the Forms appended to the Rules. These alternative sources of forms would provide illustrations, but they would never provide authority. Official Forms are clearly superior in this regard.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although the Advisory Committee cited a lack of enthusiasm for public comment on the abrogation of Rule 84 as a sign that Rule 84 should be put to rest, 374 this does not make this amendment any less important than an amendment that garners a lot of attention in the legal community. being abolished because they do not comply with Twiqbal. The tension between the pleading standards and the pleading Forms has underlined the abrogation debate through every step of the Rules Enabling Act process. Despite any explicit statement to the contrary, abrogation is an implicit endorsement of the Twiqbal standard of plausibility pleading as a heightened standard going forward without expressly amending a Rule or giving the bench and bar the opportunity to discuss the changing pleading standards.
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The only solution to avoid implicitly heightening the pleading standards is to keep Rule 84 and the Forms.
With the lack of acknowledgement of the change by the public, the abrogation of Rule 84 may go through the Rules Enabling Act process without notice or understanding of the true consequences. Judges, practitioners, and pro se litigants will all suffer from the loss of the Forms as authoritative illustrations of the Rules perhaps without even knowing it happened. All the negative consequences of abrogation could simply be avoided by delegating to a subcommittee the duty to update the Forms the same way the Administrative Office of the United States Courts does. Perhaps, with updated Forms, there will not be such a lack of enthusiasm as is cited in the reasoning for abrogation. This seemingly simple abrogation could have profound effects that go beyond what is imagined by the Rule 84 Subcomittee, the Advisory Committee, the Standing Committee, and the Judicial Conference because abrogation was simply not thought through. Abrogation will leave in its wake more questions than answers, including for example, what is sufficient under Twiqbal, and what does the legal community look to for pleading sufficiency. The clear route to avoid this is to amend the Forms instead of abrogate.
